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NOTES
GIVE ME LIBERTY OR GIVE ME SILENCE: TAKING A
STAND ON FIFTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS FOR
COURT-ORDERED THERAPY PROGRAMS
INTRODUCTION
[T] he Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion... can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, admin-
istrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects
against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be
used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that
might be so used.'
Probation is frequently conditioned on the convicted criminal's
satisfactory completion of a rehabilitative therapy program.2 A pri-
mary purpose of the criminal justice system is to protect the public by
discouraging recidivism in past offenders.3 In theory, permanent in-
carceration best serves this purpose, because a person in jail cannot
commit another crime.4 In the last century, however, the prison pop-
1 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
2 See Ann A. Holmes, Note, Alternative Sentencing in Alabama, 16 LAw & PSYCHOL REv.
217, 221-22 (1992). Many courts use "intensive supervised probation," which involves in-
creased observation and may be coupled with psychological counseling. See id.; see also Gail
Jones, The Use and Effectiveness of the Probation Order with a Condition for Psychiatric Treatment
in North Wales, 20 CAMBRIAN L. Rv. 63 (1989) (noting that most commentators are enthusi-
astic about the use of court-ordered therapy programs).
This Note assumes that such therapy programs successfully curb recidivism. See COM-
MIrEE ON GOv'T PoLIcY, GAP REPORT No. 137, FORCED ITrro TRvTMENT: THE ROLE OF
COERCION IN CLINICAL PRACrICE (1994) (noting the success of court-ordered therapy in a
number of contexts, including for sex offenders); Amicus Brief of American Professional
Society on the Abuse of Children Supporting Neither Party at 12, State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d
979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1260, cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 444 (1992) (No. 91-
687) [hereinafter APSAC Brief) (noting the significant difference in recidivism rates for
offenders who complete therapy versus those who do not participate); see also W.L. Mar-
shall & H.E. Barbaree, Outcome of Comprehensive Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment Programs, in
HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT. ISSUES, THEORIES, AND TREATMENT OF THE OFFENDER 363,
379 (W.L. Marshall et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT] ("Outpa-
tient treatment of sex offenders by cognitive-behavioral procedures... seems to be effec-
tive."). But see Lita Furby et al., Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 27
(1989) (noting the difficulty of drawing conclusions from current studies).
3 See generally WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 10 (2d ed.
1986) (discussing criminal law's goal of preventing harm to society).
4 This reasoning ignores the prevalence of crime in prison. See Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (giving statistics on crime in prison).
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ulation in the United States has increased dramatically.5 Overcrowd-
ing in jails has forced law enforcement officials to seek alternatives to
incarceration. 6 Suspended sentences and probation provide such al-
ternatives, and are often used for nondangerous offenders.7 Proba-
tion, however, does not provide the same certainty of nonrecidivism as
incarceration does;8 therefore, the increased use of probation has cor-
responded with an increase in court-ordered therapy.9 In 1978, the
Supreme Court recognized that "[a]pproximately a century ago, a re-
form movement assert[ed] that the purpose of incarceration, and
therefore the guiding consideration in sentencing, should be rehabili-
tation of the offender."' 0 This emphasis on rehabilitation" has had
enormous implications for the mental health profession. The most
important consequence has been the growth and diversification of
therapy programs ranging from substance abuse counseling to family
group therapy to sex offender treatment programs.' 2
5 See Holmes, supra note 2, at 217 ("[S]tate and federal prison populations have more
than tripled" in the past couple of decades.) See generally Benjamin Frank, The American
Prison: TheEnd of an Era, 43 FED. PROBATION 3 (1979) (arguing that due to the population
increase, incarceration can no longer be the primary form of punishment).
6 See Holmes, supra note 2, at 221-28; see also STEvE R. SMITH & ROBERT G. MEYER,
LAw, BEHAVIOR, AN MENTAL HEALTH: POuCYAND PRACTICE 445-48 (1987) (listing alterna-
tives to incarceration).
7 See Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943); ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW
OF SENTENCING 52 (1978); Holmes, supra note 2, at 219.
8 See Holmes, supra note 2, at 221; see also Furby et al., supra note 2, at 3-4 (noting that
in states which emphasize rehabilitation "the prevailing view is that simple incarceration is
not a sufficient deterrent for sex offenders." However, because "the overwhelming major-
ity of apprehended sex offenders are not incarcerated or institutionalized at all.... proba-
tion with mandated treatment... is the most common disposition.").
9 See Furby et al., supra note 2, at 4 ("In response to the increasing demand for sex
offender treatment, there has been a proliferation of both public and private outpatient
programs.").
10 United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 (1978); see Carol A. Veneziano, Prison
Inmates and Consent to Treatment: Problems and Issues, 10 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 129, 130
(1986). See generally LAFAVE & Sco-r, supra note 3, at 23-26 (discussing different justifica-
tions for punishment and the current emphasis on rehabilitation).
11 In very recent years there has been a decline in the push toward rehabilitation as
the primary goal of the criminal justice system. This decline is due to the apparent lack of
results from rehabilitative programs and the high cost of administering therapy programs.
See, e.g., SMrrH & MEYER, supra note 6, at 424-25;Justin Brooks, Addressing Recidivism: Legal
Education in Correctional Settings, 44 RuTGERS L. Rv. 699, 702 n.6 (1992) (theorizing that
this shift has been prompted by the increase in drug-related crimes); see also Michael Vi-
tiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REv. 1011 (1991) (criticizing the recent rejec-
tion of the rehabilitative model of punishment). This Note assumes that, regardless of this
shift, rehabilitation still plays a significant role in sentencing.
12 See generally HAROLD J. VE-rER & LEONARD TERRrro, CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERicA
475-81 (1984) (discussing addiction treatment and community correctional centers); Stan-
ley L. Brodsky & DonaldJ. West, Life-Skills Treatment of Sex Offenders, 6 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv.
97 (1981) (comparing different forms of treatment for sexual offenders). The sex of-
fender programs referred to in this Note do not treat violent sex crimes such as rape.
The expansion of these programs has resulted in a proliferation of new forms of treat-
ment, often focusing less on a "cure" than on controlling symptoms. There is a growing
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The dramatic expansion of therapeutic sentencing alternatives
has disturbing implications for the Fifth Amendment rights of con-
victed offenders, because cooperation of the patient is a prerequisite
to successful therapy.' 3 Sex offenders, alcoholics, batterers and child
abusers often deny both the commission of an offense and the inap-
propriateness of their actions.14 The first step toward rehabilitation,
however, is to admit that there is a problem. In criminal law, this
translates into an admission of guilt, raising the question of whether
the requirement of most therapy programs that a defendant accept
responsibility for his actions15 violates the Fifth Amendment protec-
tion against self-incrimination. 16
To answer this question this Note first discusses a Montana case,
State v. Imlay,17 which highlights one of the conflicts that arises be-
tween the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and
the need of the criminal justice system for effective rehabilitation.
Part II identifies the requirements of a basic Fifth Amendment claim.
Part III examines two examples of Fifth Amendment balancing prior
to conviction. Additionally, it discusses various alternatives to the bal-
ancing approach which have been taken in termination of parental
rights cases by courts seeking to avoid the conflict between court-or-
dered therapy and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. Part IV explores the application of the Fifth Amendment in
the post sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding. This note pro-
poses that a state's legitimate interest in compelling testimony for rea-
sons other than amassing evidence for a criminal prosecution should
be balanced against the defendant's interest in asserting the Fifth
Amendment privilege. After a verdict of guilty, this balancing may
belief among mental health professionals that sexual dysfunction such as child molestation
cannot be cured. Rather, the perpetrators can be taught to recognize signs of the problem
and control their impulses. The present psychological approach uses cognitive behavioral
therapy to prevent recidivism. See APSAC Brief, supra note 2, at 10-11; see also William D.
Pithers, Relapse Prevention with Sexual Aggressors, in HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra
note 2, at 343, 346 (discussing self-management skills of sex offenders as an alternative goal
of therapy); William D. Murphy, Assessment and Modification of Cognitive Distortions in Sex
Offenders, in HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra note 2, at 331 (describing self-modifica-
tion training).
13 See, e.g., Marshall & Barbaree, supra note 2, at 374 (noting that men who refused to
participate in treatment because of a failure to admit guilt "recidivated at a rate that was, if
anything, slightly higher than the untreated admitters").
14 See APSAC Brief, supra note 2, at 13; Jeffrey A. Klotz et al., Cognitive Restructuring
Through Law: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach to Sex Offenders and the Plea Process, 15 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 579, 581 nn.7-9 (1992).
15 This Note uses the phrase "acceptance of responsibility" interchangeably with "ad-
mission of guilt."
16 The Fifth Amendment states in relevant part: "No person shall... bi compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1260, cert. dismissed, 113 S. CL
444 (1992).
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come out in favor of lessening the extent of the constitutional protec-
tion with respect to particular inquiries. Finally, this Note analyzes the
requirements of rehabilitation schemes in the context of two recent
Supreme Court cases which show that the elements needed to trigger
a Fifth Amendment claim may be present in cases where the protec-
tion is not allowed to operate.' 8 In such situations the government's
interest in imposing a requirement of therapy outweighs a defend-
ant's interest in the Fifth Amendment protections.
I
THE CONFLICT IDENTIFIED
In State v. Imlay,19 the District Court of Cascade County found the
defendant guilty of sexually abusing a minor and sentenced him to
five years in jail.20 The judge imposed a suspended sentence, condi-
tioning Imlay's probation on the satisfactory completion of a therapy
program for sex offenders.2 1 The therapy program required Imlay to
accept responsibility for his actions. When Imlay asserted his inno-
cence, as he had throughout the trial, the therapist refused to pursue
treatment.2 2 The state prosecutor's office then petitioned for revoca-
tion of the suspended sentence on the ground that Imlay had violated
the terms of his probation.23
The district court revoked Imlay's probation and reinstated the
original five year sentence.2 4 During the hearing, the court gathered
evidence from the directors of two sexual offender treatment pro-
grams.2 5 It found that no outpatient therapy program would accept a
person who refused to admit committing a sexual assault. Moreover,
the Montana State Prison ran the only available inpatient program.2 6
The court determined that a repeat offense was improbable, but felt
constrained by the jury's guilty verdict and thus decided to revoke Im-
lay's probation.2
7
18 This Note draws a distinction between the availability of the Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege against self-incrimination and its applicability. Thus, there are some situations that
meet the requisite criteria for triggering the privilege, but, because the balance of interests
comes out in the government's favor, the constitutional protection is limited.
19 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1260, cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct.
444 (1992).
20 Id. at 980.
21 Id. at 981.
22 Id.
23 Joint Appendix at 24, State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S.
Ct. 1260, cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 444 (1992) [hereinafterJoint Appendix].
24 Id. at 36.
25 Id. at 34-35.
26 Id. at 35.
27 Id. at 36.
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The Montana Supreme Court vacated the sentence and re-
manded the case to the district court, holding that the Fifth Amend-
ment prohibits increasing a defendant's sentence for his refusal to
confess his guilt.28 The State of Montana, joined by seventeen other
states, petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari on the ground that
the Fifth Amendment was not applicable because there was no further
threat of prosecution. 29 In response, Imlay claimed that he feared a
criminal prosecution for perjury and that the district court had penal-
ized him for exercising his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate
himself.30 This Note argues that the decision of the Montana
Supreme Court is erroneous. Although the court correctly held that
Fifth Amendment protections are available in the probationary con-
text, it erred in assessing the specific application of those protections.
II
REQUIREMENTS FOR A FIFTH AMENDMENT CLAIM
The Fifth Amendment has its origins in the English common
law,31 from which it was later incorporated into the American Bill of
Rights. The framers, "[w]hile deeply committed to perpetuating a sys-
tem that minimized the possibilities of convicting the innocent, . . .
were not less concerned about the humanity that the fundamental law
28 Imlay, 813 P.2d at 985. On remand, the district court resentenced Imlay to five
years in prison, noting that, had it known of Imlay's unacceptability into a therapy pro-
gram, it would not have allowed a suspended sentence in the first place. Joint Appendix,
supra note 23, at 41.
29 See Amicus Brief Submitted by the State of Vermont on Behalf of the States of
Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah and Virginia in
Support of Petitioner, Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1260, cert.
dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 444 (1992) (No. 91-687) [hereinafter Brief of States in Support of
Petitioner]. The American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children filed a brief sup-
porting neither party. APSAC Brief, supra note 2. Additionally, the United States Depart-
ment of Justice filed a brief on behalf of the petitioner.
30 Brief for Respondent, at 9-10 Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S.
Ct. 1260, cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 444 (1992). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
heard oral arguments in the case. However, it later concluded that any opinion it would
render would be merely advisory and that the petition should have been dismissed. Mon-
tana v. Imlay, 113 S. Ct. 444 (1992) (dismissal of certiorari because improvidently granted).
Mr. Imlay would either be released on parole, or serve his complete sentence regardless of
the decision of the United States Supreme Court; thus a ruling would not have a substan-
tive impact on the rights of either party. See id. at 444-45 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
White dissented from the decision, claiming that the importance of the issue, and the
conflict among the lower courts, mandated a consideration of the case. Id. at 445 (White,
J., dissenting).
31 See generally LEONARD W. LEw, OirNs OF THE FrH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 368 (1968); WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JERor.D H. IsRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1992). At English common law, there was an oath ex officio stating
"nemo teneture seipsum prodere" (no man is bound to produce himself). When the Bill of
Rights incorporated the maxim, it varied the language to cover any forced self-incrimina-
tion. See id. at § 8.14.
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should show even to the offender."32 Thus, the protections found in
the Fifth Amendment are meant to apply to the guilty and the
innocent.
Several concerns guide the application of the Fifth Amendment.
The Supreme Court, in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,33 listed a
number of these considerations:
our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for
an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal jus-
tice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by
inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play ... ; our
respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the
right of each individual [to privacy] ... ; our distrust of self-depreca-
tory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while some-
times "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the
innocent."3 4
This does not mean, however, that the Fifth Amendment is an abso-
lute right. The courts have never interpreted the amendment to pre-
vent the use of nontestimonial incriminating evidence or voluntary
statements. 3 5 Once a court establishes that the Fifth Amendment is
implicated in a particular situation, the court must still determine the
extent of its protection. This Note proposes that such a determina-
tion should take into account the various policies behind the amend-
ment and balance the individual's interest against the government's.36
In some situations, such as the preconviction context, the balance will
strongly favor applying the full protection afforded by the Fifth
Amendment.3 7 After a verdict of guilty, however, full protection may
32 LEWy, supra note 31, at 432.
33 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
34 Id. at 55 (quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955)) (footnotes
omitted). The first concern observes the importance of not presenting a defendant with an
impossible choice; the second reflects the type of system our society favors; the third rec-
ognizes the possible abuses of police power; the fourth concern notices that the unequal
balance of power in favor of the government would lead many defendants to plead guilty
in order to avoid harsh penalties (Plea bargaining, although it raises these same concerns,
is now allowed in recognition of its usefulness in the settlement of cases without trial.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)); the fifth recognizes an individual's right to
privacy; the sixth focuses on the fear of false guilty pleas; and the seventh is an acknowledg-
ment that our society views "the determination of guilt or innocence byjust procedures" to
be "more important than punishing the guilty." LEVY, supra note 31, at 432.
35 See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304-05 (1985).
36 See discussion infra part IV.
37 A court may be able to balance in the presentencing context; however, the individ-
ual's interest in most cases will be so strong as to override the government's interest.
Although the analysis in this Note is applicable to the presentencing situation, there are
different considerations at various stages in the trial process. Accordingly, this Note con-
centrates on the application of a balancing test to the postsentencing phase of a criminal
trial.
1994]
not apply, and the court can weigh the scope of the Amendment
against society's interest in a workable criminal justice system.38
A. Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination has two
parts.3 9 First, it guarantees every person the right to remain silent
when faced with a reasonable fear of incrimination in a later criminal
proceeding. Second, it protects against the use of statements that are
the result of governmental coercion. This section focuses on the first
part of the privilege against self-incrimination. The following section
addresses the exclusion of coerced testimony.
1. Real Fear of Incrimination
For the privilege against self-incrimination to attach, the risk of
future incrimination must not merely present" 'imaginary and insub-
stantial' hazards of incrimination," but "rather... 'real and apprecia-
ble' risks."'40 If the risk is too speculative, the Fifth Amendment's
protections do not apply.41 The requirement that the fear not be im-
aginary focuses on the risk of incrimination, not prosecution. Prosecu-
tion need only be possible; it does not actually have to happen, nor
does it have to result in a conviction.42 Furthermore, the amendment
"does not distinguish degrees of incrimination."43 Thus, if the fear of
incrimination is real but minor, the amendment's protections apply.
Although the right against self-incrimination applies to defend-
ants in all proceedings, the resulting incrimination must relate to a
criminal charge. Because a probation revocation hearing is not a
criminal proceeding, the Fifth Amendment does not protect against
the use of coerced statements at such hearings, nor is a person privi-
leged to remain silent when her only fear is revocation of probation.44
38 See discussion infra part IV.
39 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
40 Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 98 (1969) (deciding that the risk presented by
the registration requirement for narcotics dealers was not substantial because it was un-
likely that illegal sales would be recorded).
41 Id. at 98.
42 Minor's fear was unreasonable because the fear of incrimination was not realistic.
Minor, 396 U.S. at 93. If the incriminating statements were likely to be recorded, the Fifth
Amendment would apply whether or not the government tended to prosecute the offense.
This distinction becomes important later in the context of Imlay-even though the govern-
ment may not often bring prosecutions for perjury based upon evidence acquired during
therapy, the fear of incrimination is still real and substantial. See infra part IV.B.2.
43 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
44 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973). In Gagnon, the defendant was
arrested for burglary while on probation. His probation was revoked without a hearing.
The Court held that, although Mr. Scarpelli was entitled to a hearing under the same
conditions as required for the revocation of parole in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972), such a hearing is not considered a criminal proceeding. The Court emphasized
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A probationer, nevertheless, may fear further criminal prosecution for
the activities resulting in the revocation of probation. Consequently,
the Supreme Court has held that:
[t]he Amendment not only protects the individual against being in-
voluntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecu-
tion but also privileges him not to answer official questions put to
him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal,
where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal
proceedings. 45
The following analysis focuses on the postsentencing context and
addresses two concerns: the right to remain silent in the face of ques-
tions related to the original criminal charge, and questions related to
a separate criminal charge.
a. Fear of incrimination related to the original criminal prosecution
Questions put to a postconviction, pre-appeal defendant about
the crime for which she was convicted raise Fifth Amendment con-
cerns. The Double Jeopardy Clause46 prohibits a second trial for a
single crime, so there is no fear of another, identical criminal prosecu-
tion.47 The convicted defendant, however, may still seek postconvic-
tion relief and therefore fear incrimination after the conclusion of the
initial trial.48 In United States v. DiFrancesco49 the Supreme Court noted
that ajury verdict of not guilty is final, although the pronouncement of
a sentence is not.50 A conviction is final when the time for appeal has
elapsed and a petition for certiorari either has been denied or no
longer can be brought on the issue.51 Therefore, when the questions
relate to the original criminal prosecution, a criminal whose convic-
tion is deemed final is not privileged to remain silent.52
the "informal nature of the proceedings and the absence of technical rules of procedure
or evidence." Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786-87. Additionally, the hearing board is not in the role
of a judge focusing on factfinding and punishment, but is concerned instead with the
rehabilitative needs of the offender. Id. at 787-88.
45 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
46 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... ").
47 See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989) (holding that a later
civil proceeding can violate the clause if the judgment serves as a penalty rather than mere
restitution).
48 Such relief may take the form of a direct appeal, a motion for a second trial based
upon new evidence, or a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
49 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
50 Id. at 132.
51 Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987) (citing United States v. Johnson,
457 U.S. 537, 542 n.8 (1982)).
52 If the questions would incriminate the defendant in another charge, then he would
be privileged to remain silent. Alternatively, if-the inquiries focus only on actions for
which he has already been tried, there would be no possibility of further prosecution, and
thus no fear of incrimination.
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Even before the convicted criminal has exhausted all avenues of
appeal, the state can impose a sentence. 53 At this point it is the
defendant who must weigh the risks and benefits of remaining si-
lent-the burden switches to him to show his innocence. 54 The Fifth
Amendment allows a defendant to remain silent before a conviction is
final, but it does not allow a person to escape a valid sentence. Thus,
a convicted criminal may not avoid a particular sentence by maintain-
ing his innocence and claiming that the protection afforded by the
Fifth Amendment excuses his lack of proof.55 This does not mean
that a state can penalize a defendant for continued silence. It means
that the state can impose an appropriate sentence for the crime. In
those cases where the Fifth Amendment protects a defendant's si-
lence, the state can still compel statements by granting immunity from
their use.
b. Fear of incrimination related to a separate criminal charge
A more difficult Fifth Amendment problem is presented when a
convicted criminal fears prosecution for a separate criminal charge.
For example, in a probation revocation proceeding, a prosecutor
might ask the defendant questions relating to a crime, such as bur-
glary, which she was suspected of committing while on probation.
Her answers to the questions may result not only in the revocation of
probation, but also in a separate criminal prosecution for burglary.
However, a convicted defendant retains some Fifth Amendment pro-
tection. For example, in Minnesota v. Murphy,56 the Court stated:
A defendant does not lose [the] protection [of the Fifth Amend-
ment] by reason of his conviction of a crime; notwithstanding that a
defendant is imprisoned or on probation at the time he makes in-
criminating statements, if those statements are compelled they are
inadmissible in a subsequent trial for a crime other than that for
which he has been convicted.57
53 Some sentences are stayed pending appeal, for example, death sentences. In other
situations, however, the government's interest in protecting the public allows the state to
incarcerate a defendant who is waiting to appeal.
54 See, e.g., Delo v. Lashley, 113 S. Ct. 1222, 1226 (1993) ("Once the defendant has
been convicted fairly in the guilt phase of the trial, the presumption of innocence disap-
pears."). This is not to say that the government no longer has the burden to prove that the
process was valid. Appeals which result in acquittal on a technicality are not proceedings
to determine guilt or innocence. Although a defendant has to prove innocence after a
verdict of guilty, the government still has the responsibility of showing that the verdict was
obtained after a constitutionally valid trial.
55 See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758 (1983) (observing that the Fifth
Amendment "has never been thought to be in itself a substitute for evidence that would
assist in meeting a burden of [proof]").
56 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
57 Id. at 426.
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Because a convicted criminal does not lose all claims to the protec-
dons of the Fifth Amendment, if a state wishes to elicit answers relat-
ing to separate criminal activity, it must provide immunity from
subsequent prosecution. This is the clearest application of the Fifth
Amendment in the postconviction context.
In many cases, however, the inquiries are not this straightforward.
For example, a court may impose general conditions of probation in-
stead of requiring answers to specific questions that relate to guilt.
The purpose of these conditions is not to amass evidence for a later
criminal prosecution, but to facilitate rehabilitation. Although such
conditions may lead to future incrimination, they are not impermis-
sible.58 Requirements that a convicted criminal reveal financial infor-
mation,59 answer his probation officer truthfully,60 or successfully
complete a therapy program 61 are examples of general probation con-
ditions that the courts have upheld as constitutional even though such
conditions might reveal incriminating evidence. 62
2. Fear of Prosecutions for Perjury: Beyond the Scope of Immunity
Statutes
Immunity statutes provide "a reconciliation of the well-recog-
nized policies behind the privilege of self-incrimination.. . , and the
need of the State, as well as the Federal Government, to obtain infor-
mation 'to assure the effective functioning of government.' "63 They
allow the government to compel a person to speak, but prevent the
use of the statements in future prosecutions. Courts construe the im-
munity broadly:64 it should "in all respects commensurate with the
protection guaranteed by the constitutional limitation."65 In other
words, statements which would have been excluded under the Fifth
Amendment must also be excluded when elicited under a grant of
immunity.
One potential problem in this area involves prosecutions for per-
jury. Immunity statutes do not apply to prosecutions for perjury, the
58 See discussion infra part IV.
59 United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 923
(1978).
60 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984). See discussion infra part IV.B.1.
61 State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1260, cert. dis-
missed, 113 S. Ct. 444 (1992). See discussion infra part V.B.2.
62 This Note deals with these situations in more detail in part IV infra.
63 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 81 (1973) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 93 (1964) (White, J., concurring)).
64 See, e.g., Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960); Ullmann v. United States, 350
U.S. 422 (1956), overruled ly Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
65 Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 141 (1911). See also New Jersey v. Portash,
440 U.S. 450, 453 (1979) (holding that the immunity granted by state statutes "must be at
least coextensive with the privilege afforded by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments").
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rationale being that the courts have an inherent power to punish false
testimony.66 This does, in fact, comport with the Constitution because
the Fifth Amendment does not entitle a defendant to lie, but merely
protects him if he chooses to remain silent.67 If a defendant chooses
to speak, "l[ t] he interests of the other party and regard for the function
of courts ofjustice to ascertain the truth become relevant, and prevail
in the balance of considerations determining the scope and limits of
the privilege against self-incrimination."68 In United States v. Apfel-
baum,69 the Supreme Court noted that the federal immunity statute's
express exception allowing prosecutions for perjury7° did not violate
the Fifth Amendment.71 The Court interpreted the privilege as not
protecting against proceedings to substantiate charges of perjury.72
Moreover, the Court held that enhancing a sentence for willful per-
jury during trial does not violate the Fifth Amendment.73 The Court
has stated that "a defendant who commits a crime and then perjures
herself in an unlawful attempt to avoid responsibility is more threaten-
66 Glickstein, 222 U.S. at 141.
67 See United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969). Knox was charged with making false
statements on his wagering registration form. The Court held that despite the fact that the
Fifth Amendment would bar the use of truthful statements in the registration in a later
criminal prosecution, it would not protect falsehoods. Id. at 82.
68 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980) (quoting Brown v. United States, 356
U.S. 148, 156 (1958)).
69 445 U.S. 115 (1980).
70 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988).
71 Apfelhaum, 445 U.S. at 126.
72 Id. See generally 70 CJ.S. Perjury § 32 (1987) (discussing that there is no "right" to
commit perjury).
73 United States v. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. 1111 (1993) (holding that the trial court may
enhance sentence of a defendant convicted of a drug-related offense for willful perjury
that occurred when the defendant testified in her own defense). The Supreme Court em-
phasized that the district court must make specific findings to support all elements of a
perjury violation. See id. at 1118. No standard, however, was articulated to determine the
sufficiency of the evidence. It appears to be possible for the trial court to simply rest on
the same evidence which was used to convict the defendant on the original charge. In
other words a defendant who claims innocence under oath can be convicted of perjury
simply on the basis that the verdict was guilty. Previous cases had held that the privilege
mandates that a sentence cannot be augmented because of an unsubstantiated belief that a
defendant committed perjury. See, e.g., Poteet v. Fauver, 517 F.2d 393 (3rd Cir. 1975);
Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
This approach appears to place more weight on the need of the criminal system to
prevent false testimony than the individual's right to testify on his or her own behalf. Be-
cause a defendant convicted of another offense may have his sentence enhanced based on
a claim of perjury simply because the final verdict in the case is guilty, defendants may be
less likely to testify on the their own behalf. This is an example of balancing the Fifth
Amendment protections against society's interest in an effective criminal system. See dis-
cussion infra parts III & IV. Although this Note focuses on the government's interest in
rehabilitation, Dunnigan seems to allow other objectives of the criminal system, such as the
need for truthful testimony, to take precedence over the protections afforded by the Fifth
Amendment.
710 [Vol. 79:700
NOTE-COURT-ORDERED THERAPY
ing to society and less deserving of leniency than a defendant who
does not so defy the trial process."74
In summary, a defendant must establish the existence of a real
fear of criminal incrimination for the first part of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege to apply. The adequacy of this fear may depend on
whether the incrimination is related to the original criminal charge or
to a different prosecution. When the government grants immunity,
the fear is extinguished and the Fifth Amendment does not apply be-
cause statements made under the grant cannot be used against the
person in a criminal prosecution. However, if a person previously has
made statements under oath, subsequent inconsistent statements,
even if made under a grant of immunity, can be used in a criminal
prosecution for perjury.
B. Exclusion of Coerced Testimony
The second part of the privilege against self-incrimination pre-
vents the use of statements acquired through governmental compul-
sion.7 5 The amendment's protections are not applicable to voluntary
statements and are generally not self-executing-they must be as-
serted.76 There is no need for a knowing and intelligent waiver in
most cases.77 In some situations, however, the mere failure to claim
the privilege does not constitute a waiver. In these cases, special cir-
cumstances lead the courts to assume that compulsion is present and
to allow defendants automatic immunity from the use of the state-
ments in later prosecutions. The following three sections discuss situ-
ations in which the Fifth Amendment protections are self-executing.
1. Incrimination by Assertion of the Privilege
When the claim of the privilege itself would result in incrimina-
tion, the courts treat the privilege as self-executing. In Hoffman v.
United States,78 the Supreme Court held that " [t] o sustain the privilege,
it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the
setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or
an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous be-
cause injurious disclosure could result."79 This situation is most evi-
dent in the context of federal income and excise taxation of gamblers.
The mere act of refusing to file a tax return and claiming the privilege
74 Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. at 1118.
75 See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653 (1976).
76 See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970) (holding that a person can lose
the privilege simply by failing to claim it).
77 Se id.
78 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
79 Id. at 486-87.
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incriminates the taxpayer. Consequently, the Court has held that
merely failing to file triggers Fifth Amendment protections.80
The privilege does not apply, however, when the government has
a legitimate regulatory interest, unrelated to a criminal prosecution,
in compelling information. For example, in California v. Byers8l the
Supreme Court determined that a California statute requiring all au-
tomobile drivers involved in an accident to stop and provide basic
identifying information does not violate the Fifth Amendment.8 2 The
Court found that divulging one's name and address is not sufficiently
incriminating to invoke the Fifth Amendment's protection.83 The
Court also noted that the statute was regulatory, not criminal, in na-
ture and thus did not implicate the constitutional protection.8 4 The
Court stated that "tension between the State's demand for disclosures
and the protection of the right against self-incrimination... must be
resolved in terms of balancing the public need... and the individual
claim."8 5
2. Custodial Interrogation
The Fifth Amendment protections are also self-executing in cer-
tain cases of "custodial interrogation." For example, Miranda v. Ari-
zona§6 established procedural safeguards for defendants who are
questioned while in police custody.87 The Supreme Court concluded
that under the psychological pressures of interrogation during cus-
tody, suspects may provide statements they would otherwise have re-
fused to furnish.88 Therefore, in such contexts, suspects must be told
of their constitutional rights. Statements made in the absence of such
80 See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S.
62 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). See generallyJoseph N. Laplante,
Note, Self Incrimination on Income Tax Returns: A Compelling Dilemma, 43 TAx LAw. 225
(1989) (identifying difficulties with the current system).
81 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
82 See id.
83 Id. at 431.
84 Id. at 430. This is an example of pre-indictment balancing. See discussion infra part
III.
85 Id. at 427.
86 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A full analysis of Miranda, and thejurisprudence surrounding
it, is beyond the scope of this Note.
87 Prior to Miranda, the courts inquired as to whether a statement was voluntary or
involuntary. See Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the
"New"Fifth Amendment and the "Old" Voluntariness Test 65 MICH. L. Rxv. 59 (1966) (asserting
the ineffectiveness and unworkability of the old voluntariness test). See generally 2 LAFAVE &
IsRAEL, supra note 31, at § 6.2 (1992) (discussing the test for voluntariness).
The Supreme Court set out the standard for voluntariness in Procunier v. Atchley, 400
U.S. 446, 453 (1971). Although Miranda now covers many Fifth Amendment situations,
the voluntariness standard is still applicable outside the custodial context. See, e.g.,
Withrow v. Williams 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
88 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-49.
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warnings may not be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 9 In-
vestigators must provide such warnings whenever a person's "freedom
of action is curtailed in any significant way."90 Once outside the po-
lice setting, however, the parameters of the exception are unclear.
Later cases have narrowed the holding in Miranda,91 and the Supreme
Court has been reluctant to expand its scope into the probationary
context. 9
2
3. The Penalty Situations
The final situation in which a court will presume compulsion oc-
curs when a person is given a choice between either exercising the
Fifth Amendment privilege and being penalized, or waiving the privi-
lege and incriminating himself. Not all sanctions are considered pen-
alties for Fifth Amendment purposes. The Supreme Court in Garrity
v. New Jersey93 held that civil sanctions are enough to trigger Fifth
Amendment protection-the question is simply whether the defend-
ant has been deprived of his free choice to admit, deny or refuse to
answer.94 In Le/kowitz v. Turley95 the Court stated that a "waiver se-
cured under threat of substantial economic sanction cannot be
termed voluntary."96 The Supreme Court has also found the threat of
loss of employment to be a penalty.97
In Thomas v. United States,98 the Fifth Circuit held that increasing
a defendant's sentence because he would not plead guilty is a penalty
and violates the Constitution.99 After pronouncing a guilty verdict,
the sentencing judge gave the defendant an ultimatum: he could con-
fess to the crime and possibly face a reduced sentence, or he could
maintain his innocence and face the maximum sentence for bank rob-
bery.100 Thomas refused to confess and the court imposed the maxi-
89 See i&
90 Id. at 467.
91 See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984) (establishing the "public
safety exception" to Miranda and noting that "overriding considerations of public safety
[can] justify [an] officer's failure to provide Miranda warnings"); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291, 800-01 (1980) (defining interrogation as "express questioning or its functional
equivalent"); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (allowing a defendant to waive his
constitutional rights after only a partial warning).
92 See discussion infra part IV.B.1.
93 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
94 See id. (finding application of Fifth Amendment rights in case in which police of-
ficers convicted of conspiracy were given the choice either to incriminate themselves or to
forfeit their jobs).
95 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
96 Id- at 82-83.
97 See Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968).
98 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966).
99 Id. at 946.
100 Id. at 942.
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mum sentence. 10 1  In holding the district court's actions
unconstitutional, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that "Thomas had not
been finally and irrevocably adjudged guilty."10 2 Thus, if he con-
fessed, he would have been hurting his chances of success on appeal.
The choice between either maintaining his innocence or receiving a
lighter sentence violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights.
Ten years later, in United States v. Wright,103 the same court reaffirmed
this idea, stating that "[a] defendant does not lose his right to appeal
or to continue to assert his innocence simply because the verdict of
the jury is guilty.' 0 4
The majority of other circuits follow the Thomas court's reason-
ing, holding that a threat to increase a defendant's sentence if he will
not admit his guilt is unconstitutional. 10 5 The Ninth Circuit in Gol-
laher v. United States,106 however, declined to follow the rationale of
Thomas and applied a balancing test,10 7 emphasizing the importance
of rehabilitation over the defendant's right to maintain his innocence
after conviction. l08 The court reasoned that when a criminal is unwill-
ing to take the first step toward rehabilitation-acceptance of respon-
sibility-the judge may impose a stricter sentence. 10 9
Almost twenty years later, in United States v. Mourning,"0 the Fifth
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
two point reduction for "acceptance of responsibility.""' For each
101 Id.
102 Id. at 945.
103 533 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1976).
104 Id. at 216.
105 See, e.g., United States v. Kovic, 830 F.2d 680, 691 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1044 (1988); United States v. Espinosa, 771 F.2d 1382, 1404 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1023 (1985); United States v. Roe, 670 F.2d 956, 973 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 856 (1982); United States v. DiRusso, 535 F.2d 673, 674 (1st Cir. 1976); United
States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836, 847 (2d Cir. 1968).
106 419 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969).
107 See discussion infra part IV for a more detailed analysis of the application of a bal-
ancing test after conviction.
108 See Gollaher, 419 F.2d at 530.
109 Id. A defendant who admits guilt is a better candidate for rehabilitation than one
who refuses to accept responsibility for his actions. See supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
110 914 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1990).
111 Id. at 705-07 (discussing U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N GUIDELINES MANuAL § 3E1.1
(1989) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. Although the circuits agree about the constitutionality of
§ 3E1.1, they do not agree as to its application. The First, Second and Ninth Circuits hold
that a defendant need only accept responsibility as to the offenses charged. However, the
Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits hold that the sentencing court has discretion to take
into account all of the circumstances in determining the defendant's acceptance of respon-
sibility. See Kinder v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2290 (1992) (WhiteJ. dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (identifying the conflict between the circuits); United States v. Frierson, 945
F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1515 (1992); United States v. O'Neil, 936
F.2d 599 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1990); United
States v. Gordon 895 F.2d 932 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 846 (1990); United States v.
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crime, the guidelines provide for the calculation of a base offense
level.112 A court may then consider aggravating and mitigating factors
and adjust the offense level accordingly."13 In practice there is no sub-
stantive -difference between penalizing a defendant for maintaining
his innocence by refusing to reduce his sentence and rewarding a de-
fendant who accepts responsibility by indirectly decreasing his prison
term."14 When trying to make a distinction, courts often focus on the
purpose of sentencing, noting the difference between actions en-
gaged in for deterrent or rehabilitative purposes and those used as
punitive measures. 115 If the purpose of sentencing is exclusively re-
tributive, there is no reason to lighten a criminal's sentence for ac-
cepting responsibility.1 6 If the purpose of sentencing is at least
partially rehabilitative, however, courts should consider the criminal's
acceptance of responsibility in determining the sentence."17
The emphasis in the postsentencing context should not be on the
penalty-leniency distinction. The availability of the Fifth Amendment
in a particular circumstance should depend instead upon the purpose
of the action or inquiry that raised constitutional concerns. This
should diminish the number of inconsistencies generated by the pen-
alty-leniency line and clarify the application of the privilege. When a
court imposes an increased sentence as a punitive measure it is likely
to violate the Fifth Amendment. In contrast, when the court's reasons
for varying the length of incarceration are related to rehabilitative or
other legitimate goals of the criminal system besides punishment, the
Mourning, 914 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir.
1990); United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 839 (1990);
See also United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010 (11th Cir. 1989).
112 See U.S.S.G. § 3El.1.
113 See id.
114 SeeJohn C. Coffee,Jr., "Twisting Slowly in the Wnd": A Search for Constitutional Limits
on Coercion of the Criminal Defendant; 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 211, 218 (questioning whether
leniency can be distinguished from a penalty in the Fifth Amendment context).
115 See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989) (holding that a subsequent
civil prosecution can violate the Double Jeopardy Clause when the proceedings are not
designed to be remedial but seek to impose punitive sanctions instead); Allen v. Illinois,
478 U.S. 364 (1986) (distinguishing between information gathered for therapeutic pur-
poses and that used for a criminal prosecution); Agustin v. Quern, 611 F.2d 206, 211 (7th
Cir. 1979) (holding that the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws only ap-
plies to the imposition of punishment, and because laws designed to protect the public are
not punitive, they are not barred). The Fifth Amendment itself draws a distinction be-
tween civil and criminal prosecutions, the former being primarily restitutionary and the
latter involving punitive measures.
Section 3El.1's purpose is to recognize "the increased potential for rehabilitation
among those who feel and show true remorse." United States v. Belgard, 694 F. Supp. 1488,
1497 (D. Or. 1988), affd sub nom., United States v. Summers, 895 F.2d 615 (9th Cir.),. cert.
denid, 498 U.S. 959 (1990).
116 See generally LAFAVE & Sco-r, supra note 3, at 25-27 (discussing theory of
retribution).
117 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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defendant's constitutional protections should be balanced against the
government's interest. This model concedes that the sentencing dif-
ferences which result from a defendant's acceptance or denial of re-
sponsibility create coercive pressures. Yet such compulsion cannot be
thought to always violate the Fifth Amendment, because a workable
criminal system.must be able to take into account a defendant's suita-
bility for rehabilitation.
III
BALANCING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT IN THE PRECONVICTION
CONTEXT
This Part analyzes preconviction situations in which Fifth Amend-
ment concerns are implicated, but the courts have held that there is
no violation of the privilege. By examining preconviction situations in
which the courts have engaged in implicit balancing, this Note shows
that the application of the Fifth Amendment is not absolute. This
Note also argues that the courts should apply a balancing test which
takes into account both society's interest in maintaining effective law
enforcement and the individual's interest in applying the Fifth
Amendment privilege.
Although it did not list specific factors to be considered, the
Supreme Court explicitly referred to the use of a balancing test in two
Fifth Amendment cases. In Lejkowitz v. Tury" 8 the Court recognized
the state's strong interest in questioning its employees, but noted that
"claims of overriding interests are not unusual in Fifth Amendment
litigation and they have not fared well."" 9 Five years later in New Jersey
v. Portash,'20 the Court held that balancing was impermissible in cases
in which testimony was given in response to a guarantee of immu-
nity.121 Despite these comments, the Court has not completely re-
futed the application of a balancing test. This Note argues that
although the courts have not explicitly used a balancing test in con-
junction with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, they have done so implicitly. 122 This section identifies cases in
which courts have weighed the relevant concerns and allowed Fifth
Amendment protections to yield to societal interests in effective law
enforcement.
118 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
119 Id. at 78.
120 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
121 Id. at 459. The Court held that because the situation involved "the constitutional
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination in its most pristine form," it was inappropri-
ate to consider the government's interest in using the compelled testimony. Id.
122 See infra part III.B.4.
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There are two situations where courts have balanced Fifth
Amendment concerns in the presentencing, and even preconviction,
context: in permitting the use of guilty pleas, and in determining the
constitutionality of court-ordered therapy programs in cases involving
the termination of parental rights. These situations demonstrate that
the privilege against self-incrimination is not absolute. Even in the
preconviction context, in which the defendant has a strong interest in
avoiding self-incrimination, courts have been willing to balance the
individual's interest against the public interest in maintaining an ef-
fective criminal justice system. The courts' willingness to balance in
preconviction cases lends strong support for balancing in postconvic-
tion cases.
A. Guilty Pleas and Plea Bargaining
In Brady v. United States,'2 3 the Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of guilty pleas. Justice White, writing for the majority,
stated, "[w] e decline to hold.., that a guilty plea is compelled and
invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the de-
fendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser pen-
alty."12 4 The Court reasoned that a defendant who chooses to go to
trial does not face a greater sentence merely because he refused to
plead guilty-he simply faces the punishment legally imposed for the
crime of which he is found guilty. It is not unconstitutional for the
state to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substan-
tial benefit to the government and who demonstrates by his plea that
he is willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional system in
a frame of mind that affords hope for successful rehabilitation in a
shorter period than might otherwise be necessary. 125
In coming to this conclusion, the Supreme Court, although it did
not explicitly refer to the use of a balancing test, determined that cer-
tain interests outweighed the Fifth Amendment privilege prior to con-
viction. For example, the state's interest in facilitating rehabilitation
and avoiding the expense of a full trial are sufficient to justify encour-
aging a guilty plea, despite the potential for unfair pressure on the
defendant. Balancing such as this in the preconviction stage provides
strong support for the use of a balancing test in the postconviction
setting when a defendant has already been found guilty.
123 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
124 Id at 751.
125 Id. at 753.
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B. Therapy as a Condition of Family Reunification
Unlike defendants in the plea bargaining context, parents whose
children are removed from their custody by the state usually have not
been indicted on criminal charges. In many child abuse and neglect
actions, courts order the parents to complete therapy programs.
Regaining custody of the children is predicated upon successful com-
pletion of the program, during which the parents must accept respon-
sibility for their actions.126 Because these civil custody cases may lead
to future criminal prosecution, parents may fear the use in a criminal
child abuse trial of statements they made during therapy. The state
courts which have addressed this issue have reacted in different ways.
1. The California Approach: Privileging Therapist-Patient
Communications
The first alternative, followed by the California Court of Appeals
in In Re Eduardo A.,1 27 is to hold that therapist-patient communica-
tions are privileged and cannot be revealed in court. The court em-
phasized that psychological counseling is important to the
determination of parental fitness. Consequently, the parents must
feel free to speak honestly. Often the exact nature of the disclosures
is unnecessary to the proper determination of custody. If this is the
case, then the doctor need testify only to the overall fitness of the
parents and need not relate specific facts revealed during counseling.
Because the doctor does not relate any of the parents' statements to
the court in such cases, there is no fear of incrimination and thus, the
Fifth Amendment protections are unnecessary.
Treating the therapist-patient relationship as privileged, however,
does not necessarily avoid Fifth Amendment problems. 128 The exact
scope of the privilege is often unclear, because there may be many
exceptions which operate in different circumstances. 129 Furthermore,
the privilege only prevents the therapist from taking the stand and
126 See generally William W. Patton, Note, The World Where Parallel Lines Converge: The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Concurrent Civil and Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings, 24
GA. L. REv. 473, 510-23 (1990).
127 261 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). This privilege is not thought to apply to
communications with a therapist during a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation. The court
in Eduardo distinguished between the two situations, citing the therapeutic purpose of the
counseling programs as opposed to the inquisitive purpose of the psychiatric evaluations.
Id. at 69-70.
128 It is beyond the scope of this Note to analyze the application of privilege in the
therapy context.
129 See, e.g., People v. Cabral, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 866 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
when the defendant attempts to establish the existence of a therapeutic relationship, the
scope of the privilege will be interpreted narrowly). See also State v. Rupp, 614 So.2d 1323
(La. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that the therapist-patient privilege does not apply in child
abuse prosecutions).
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testifying about the specific nature of the communications with the
patient. As evidenced by the holding in Tarasoff v. Regents of Califor-
nia,130 a therapist may be required to reveal information gathered
during counseling if the patient's statements indicate that he is likely
to seriously injure a third party.' 31 Privileging the therapist-client rela-
tionship does not necessarily prevent the recipient of the therapist's
information from testifying. Finally, if therapy is openly conditioned
upon the patient's admission of guilt, the therapist's certification of
the defendant's successful completion of the program may provide
grounds for a perjury charge. 132 Although this might not be enough
in all situations to convict on a perjury charge, it could give rise to a
reasonable fear of incrimination and thus trigger the protection of the
Fifth Amendment. The chances of the government charging a
defendant with perjury might not be overwhelmingly high, but the
opportunity for such a prosecution exists, and must be taken into ac-
count in determining the availability of the Fifth Amendment
protections.
2. The Minnesota Approach: No Coercion
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in In re S.A.V,13 3 acknowledged
the possibility of a subsequent criminal prosecution based on disclo-
sures made in court-ordered therapy programs, but held that requir-
ing a parent to cooperate with a psychological evaluation did not
violate the Fifth Amendment because there was no compulsion. The
court stated that "[t] ermination [of parental rights] in such a situation
is not, however, a sanction for exercise of a constitutional right, but
simply the necessary result of failure to rectify parental deficien-
cies."13 4 The court emphasized that the state had an interest in pro-
tecting the children and that the termination of parental rights is
130 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
131 Id. It is it not unheard of for probation to be revoked as a result of incriminating
information acquired during therapy. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, reh'g
denied, 466 U.S. 945 (1984); see discussion infra part IV.B.1. In a recent Arizona case, a
probationer invited his probation officer to join him during his weekly sex-offender ther-
apy group. During the meeting he admitted to breaking into the homes of three women
and stealing their underwear. The probation officer, acting on the new information, insti-
gated successful proceedings to revoke probation. News of the Weird, WASH. Crrv PAPER, Oct.
10, 1993, at 16.
132 Although the exact nature of the communications would be privileged, the success-
ful completion of a therapy program which required the defendant to admit guilt would
provide grounds for a perjury prosecution. The therapist could certify that the defendant
completed the program, and that the completion was premised on the defendant's admis-
sion of guilt.
13 392 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
134 Id. at 264. This is analogous to the Rylander Court's statement about the burden of
proof. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752. The Fifth Amendment silence cannot be used as a substi-
tute for proving parental fitness. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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merely a result of the parents' unsuitability. 3 5 In a later case, In re
JW,13 6 the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to force parents to re-
veal specific evidence which could implicate them in a separate crimi-
nal proceeding. 3 7 The court noted that the state could, however,
compel the relevant testimony if it granted immunity.' 38 This narrow
holding did not overrule the lower court case, but simply restricted
the court's ability to compel particular facts or explanations from the
parents in such situations.
Minnesota's approach, however, fails to evaluate appropriately
the extent of the Fifth Amendment's protections. First, the threat of
termination of parental rights is undoubtedly coercive. Furthermore,
even if the court cannot compel the parents to answer a specific in-
quiry, the risk of incrimination still exists-successful therapy would
require the parents to admit guilt and such evidence could be used to
bring criminal charges of child abuse.' 3 9 In such a circumstance, both
the real fear of incrimination and the presence of governmental coer-
cion implicate the Fifth Amendment. The better approach is to weigh
the interests of the parents in avoiding incrimination against the
state's interest in protecting children. This is the approach that the
Vermont courts take to solve the problems which stem from the use of
therapy as a condition of family reunification.
3. The Vermont Approach: Balancing
In State v. Mace,'40 the Vermont Supreme Court found that the
requirement that a defendant participate in therapy, as directed by his
therapist, was a condition "reasonably related to the rehabilitation of
[the] defendant and thus lies within the discretion of the court.' 4'
The court acknowledged that the situation implicated Fifth Amend-
ment but balanced the interests involved and found that the protec-
tions did not apply in this case. Because the defendant pled guilty,
the court concluded that there was no fear of forcing an innocent
135 In re S.A.V., 392 N.W.2d at 264.
136 415 N.W.2d 879 (Minn. 1987).
137 Id. The trial court ordered the parents to explain the prior death of their nephew.
In reversing, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the parents were threatened with the
loss of their children and were penalized for exercising the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. See also In reJ.G.W, 433 N.W.2d 885, 886 (Minn. 1989) ("[I]t is a violation of the
parent's fifth amendment privilege to directly require the parent to admit guilt as a part of
a court-ordered treatment plan .... [However,] the privilege does not protect the parent
from the consequences of any failure to succeed in a court-ordered treatment plan.").
138 In reJ.W., 415 N.W.2d at 884.
139 In this situation, the California approach might work. If the communications were
privileged, they could not be offered in court; only the therapist's general determination
of parental fitness would be admissible. The general certification would not be likely to
provide grounds for a prosecution for child abuse.
140 578 A.2d 104 (Vt. 1990).
141 Id. at 107.
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person to lie. Moreover, the program was designed to rehabilitate the
defendant through recognition of his abusive behavior, rather than to
subject him to further prosecution. Finally, the court reasoned that
the defendant's fears of a separate sexual abuse charge arising out of
acts discovered through therapy was not a realistic concern and thus
did not justify Fifth Amendment protection. 142
The Mace court's analysis is flawed in one respect: although it
may be unlikely that the state will use the evidence discovered in ther-
apy to institute separate criminal proceedings, this does not dissipate
the fear of incrimination. Whether the state chooses not to initiate
further criminal charges speaks to the possibility of prosecution and
not to the possibility of incrimination. A parent's fear of incrimina-
tion is real and substantial, and therefore triggers the Fifth Amend-
ment protections. The government cannot override the privilege
simply by later deciding not to prosecute after it has all the evidence.
4. Interests of the Parties
In custody cases and in the plea bargaining context, courts have
applied a balancing test to determine the scope of the application of
the Fifth Amendment privilege in a particular situation. The govern-
ment has a strong interest in protecting children. This interest, like
the independent regulatory interest in gathering evidence in civil pro-
ceedings, is unrelated to procuring a criminal conviction.143 In Balti-
more City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight'44 the Supreme Court
noted that:
When a person assumes control over items that are the legitimate
object of the government's noncriminal regulatory powers, the abil-
ity to invoke the [Fifth Amendment] privilege is reduced... Once
[a child is] adjudicated... in need of assistance, his care and safety
[become] the particular object of the State's regulatory interests.1 45
142 Id. at 108. Additionally, in State v. Gleason, 576 A.2d 1246 (Vt. 1990), the Vermont
Supreme Court held that conditioning probation on participation in counseling was not
an abuse of discretion because the condition was reasonably related to the rehabilitation of
the defendant.
143 See discussion supra part II.B.1.
144 493 U.S. 549 (1990). For commentaries on the case, see Irene M. Rosenberg,
Bouknight: Of Abused Children and the Parental Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 76 IowA L.
Rv. 535 (1991) (asserting that when there is a hybrid (civil and criminal) purpose behind
the production order, a court should balance the interests involved) and H. Bruce Dorsey,
Note, Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight: The Required Records Doc-
t~ine-Logic and Beyond, 50 MD. L. REv. 446 (1991) (advocating the use of a balancing test).
145 Bouknigh4 493 U.S. at 558-59. The court held the defendant in contempt for fail-
ure to produce her child. It decided that the Fifth Amendment was not implicated be-
cause the state requested production of the child for reasons related to his well-being and
not to gain information to be used in a criminal prosecution against the defendant.
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Questioning parents about the abuse of their own children is rel-
evant to determining whether they are fit parents. The inquiry serves
rehabilitative purposes, not punitive ones. Although information ob-
tained during questioning may result in termination of custody, or
criminal prosecution, this is simply a logical consequence of the ad-
mission rather than an intended penalty. The applicability of the
Fifth Amendment protection turns on the primary purpose for the
proceeding. If the underlying purpose is to provide treatment or pro-
tection, rather than to impose punishment, then the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege is limited.146 This reasoning is similar to that used in
the "independent regulatory scheme" exception discussed earlier.147
If the court phrases the condition in such a way that the requirement
is merely that the parents show their fitness or successfully complete
therapy, it should be considered constitutional. 148 If parents are spe-
cifically required to incriminate themselves, such a requirement
should violate the Fifth Amendment. When incrimination is merely a
by-product of the requirement of showing fitness, the state's interest
in protecting children may override the Fifth Amendment's protec-
tion against coercive pressures. These cases indicate a trend towards
recognizing the importance of therapy as a tool for rehabilitation and
the state's interest in promoting it.
The conflict between the state's interest and the Fifth Amend-
ment in any of these cases can be avoided by granting immunity to the
parents from the use of their incriminating statements. 149 The
defendant in Bouknight was held in contempt for failure to produce
her child in response to a court order.150 If the state had simply
granted immunity, the defendant could have produced the child with
no fear of incrimination. The holding is evidence of the Court's will-
ingness to override Fifth Amendment protections, even when there
are alternatives available. It also may be evidence of the weight that
the Court accords to the government's interest in gathering evidence
for child abuse prosecutions.
In both the guilty plea and parental right termination cases,
courts have imposed some limitations on the scope of the Fifth
146 When the state's goal is rehabilitation, and not punishment, less weight should be
placed on procedural safeguards. SeeAllen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986). Allen dealt with
the issue of whether proceedings to declare a defendant a "sexually dangerous person"
were criminal within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 365. Noting the rehabil-
itative purpose behind the proceedings, id. at 370, the Court held that such proceedings
were essentially civil actions and that the process did not require application of the Fifth
Amendment safeguards. Id. at 374-75. In so deciding, the Court weighed governmental
and individual interests. See id. at 372-75.
147 See discussion supra part II.B.1.
148 See discussion supra part III.B.2.
149 The immunity statutes would reach these situations.
150 Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 549.
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Amendment by balancing the constitutional protections against the
needs of the criminal justice system. Although these two preconvic-
tion situations may be unique, both are evidence that the privilege is
not absolute. These situations also demonstrate the appropriateness
of using a balancing test to determine the extent of the Fifth Amend-
ment protection against self-incrimination in the postconviction con-
text when the government's interest in rehabilitation is more
pronounced.
IV
BALANCING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT IN THE
POSTSENTENCING CONTEXT
The Fifth Amendment is not absolute; the courts have weakened
its prohibition on compelling a defendant to inculpate himself. For
example, the absence of immunity for prosecutions for perjury shows
that a state's interest in promoting truthfulness outweighs the Fifth
Amendment privilege. Additionally, the legitimate regulatory interest
exception allows the government to compel information when it has a
strong public need.15 ' The custodial interrogation exception has
been limited to the police context.15 2 Furthermore, the acceptability
of guilty pleas recognizes that the need for official leniency when a
defendant imparts a substantial benefit to the state outweighs an indi-
vidual's interest in avoiding coercive pressures.
The Fifth Amendment privilege is not absolute prior to convic-
tion, and it should not be considered absolute after conviction. This
Note proposes a two step analysis for Fifth Amendment questions, one
which is similar to the two part due process test articulated by the
Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge.153 First, a court should deter-
mine whether the Fifth Amendment is triggered, for example,
whether there is a real fear of incrimination and governmental com-
pulsion. Second, if so, the court should determine whether a constitu-
tional violation occurred. In order to answer the second question in
the postsentencing context, courts should apply a balancing test as the
Supreme Court did in Matthews.'54
151 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
152 See discussion supra part II.B.2.
153 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
154 Id. It is important to acknowledge that the text of the Fifth Amendment does not
explicitly support this two step analysis. Unlike the Fourth Amendment, which has a built-
in reasonableness inquiry in that a court first determines whether there was a warrantless
search or seizure and then applies a reasonableness test to determine whether the Amend-
ment has been violated, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is abso-
lute on its face. As noted above, however, application of the amendment's protections by
the courts has not been absolute. As with the Fourth Amendment, a court must first de-
cide whether the Fifth Amendment protections apply. Second, the court should apply a
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The balancing test proposed here recognizes the need for proce-
dural protections, yet it does not undermine the efficacy of rehabilita-
tive programs. This Note does not set out the exact weight to accord
each consideration but merely defines the parameters that the courts
should consider in interpreting a universal test. The following section
first provides a background on probationary conditions and then dis-
cusses two cases which identify important factors to be considered in
balancing. It then identifies the factors that should be balanced to
determine the application of the Fifth Amendment in the post-
sentencing context. Finally, this section applies the test to two recent
Supreme Court cases.
A. Balancing Relevant Conditions of Probation and Fifth
Amendment Protections
The criminal justice system assumes that a verdict is correct and it
does not provide a sentencing alternative for those who are wrongly
convicted beyond the regular avenues of direct appeal and habeas
corpus. Probation is not a means for wrongly convicted defendant's
to escape jail, but is instead a form of punishment which is less severe
than incarceration. It allows a state to avoid imprisoning defendants
who do not present a threat to society. A person placed on probation,
therefore, is presumed guilty. Although she retains certain constitu-
tional rights, her rights must be balanced against the requirements of
an effective criminal justice system.
1. The Federal Probation Act and the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act
The Federal Probation Act authorizes courts to impose probation
or suspend a defendant's sentence for crimes committed before No-
vember 1, 1987.155 Conditions of probation must not be more strin-
gent than necessary for effective rehabilitation and protection of the
public.156 Probation may be revoked at any time for the violation of a
condition of probation, or for events which occurred before the pro-
bationary period started.' 57 Thus, a perjury conviction resulting from
false testimony given before the probation was effective would be
balancing test to determine the extent of the constitutional protection-whether the indi-
vidual's interest outweighs the government's interest.
155 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982) (repealed 1984, but effective for crimes committed before
November 1, 1987). See generally Beth M. Elfrey, Project, Probation, Twentieth Annual Review
of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1989-90, 79 GEO. L.J.
1149 (1991) (discussing both the provisions and judicial treatment of the Act).
156 Elfrey, supra note 155, at 1161.
157 Id. at 1162.
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grounds for terminating the probation and reinstating the
sentence.158
The 1984 Sentencing Reform Act replaced the Federal Probation
Act and is in effect for all crimes committed after November 1,
1987. 159 The 1984 act differs from the Federal Probation Act in sev-
eral respects. First, the new act provides clear guidelines for imposing
probation. 60 Second, the act allows courts to impose conditions of
probation "reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the
offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the goals
of sentencing."' 6 ' Additionally, a court may modify the conditions at
any time during probation following a hearing. 6 2 Like the Federal
Probation Act, the Sentencing Reform Act allows a court to revoke
probation for any violation during the probationary period, and per-
mits the court to reinstate the original sentence, impose a new sen-
tence or provide additional conditions of probation. 63 Although the
act substantially clarifies the guidelines for imposing probationary
conditions, it does not end the Fifth Amendment inquiry. The consti-
tutionality of certain conditions of probation and the permissibility of
specific inquiries remain at issue. The next subsection sets out a test
which analyzes the relationship between conditions of probation and
the protections of the Fifth Amendment.
2. Balancing Considerations: Legitimate Goals and Relevant
Inquiries
In United States v. Pierce,64 the Ninth Circuit held that a condition
of probation requiring a defendant to reveal financial information
does not violate the Fifth Amendment. 65 In determining that the
condition promoted the rehabilitative goals of the Federal Probation
Act, the court relied on a test articulated in United States v. Consuelo-
Gonzalez. 66 In Consuelo-Gonzalez the Ninth Circuit held that a proba-
tioner is not considered to have voluntarily waived his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege with regard to specific probation conditions merely
158 See, e.g., United States v. Stehl, 665 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1981) (probation revocation
proceeding followed perjury conviction).
159 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3674, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988). See
generally Elfrey, supra note 155, at 1149-59 (discussing both the provisions and judicial treat-
ment of the 1984 act); Wendy R. Willis, Project, Probation, Twenty-second Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals, GEo. L.J. 1491, 1496
(1993).
160 Elfrey, supra note 155, at 1149.
161 Willis, supra note 159, at 1493.
162 Id. at 1494.
163 Id. at 1495-96. Probation revocation proceedings are governed by rules of criminal
procedure. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1.
164 561 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978).
165 Id.
166 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
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because he failed either to assert the right, or to object at the sentenc-
ing.167 The Pierce court noted that "[a]s a practical matter, a defend-
ant's consent to a probation condition is likely to be nominal where
consent is given only to avoid imprisonment."' 68 However, this does
not end the inquiry. Although Fifth Amendment claims may not be
extinguished with regard to a specific probationary condition, this
does not mean that the privilege applies to all situations. The Pierce
court applied the Consuelo-Gonzalez balancing test to establish whether
the condition was justified by the needs of rehabilitation.' 69
The Consuelo-Gonzalez test examines three elements in determin-
ing whether a condition is reasonably related to the purposes of
probation:
(1) the purposes sought to be served by probation;
(2) the extent to which constitutional rights enjoyed by law-abid-
ing citizens should be accorded to probationers;
(3) the legitimate needs of law enforcement.' 70
These factors balance the rehabilitative interest of imposing probation
and the constitutional protection of the Fifth Amendment. This ap-
proach has had considerable influence. Several courts have adopted
this balancing approach,17 ' and the Sentencing Reform Act codified
its elements, thereby permitting courts to balance the relevant inter-
ests when setting conditions of probation. 72
In Asherman v. Meachum 73 the Second Circuit used a balancing
analysis to determine that the revocation of a prisoner's home release
status for failure to answer relevant questions did not violate the Fifth
Amendment. The court noted that "public agencies retain the au-
thority to ask questions relevant to their public responsibilities and to
take adverse action against those whose refusal to answer impedes the
discharge of those responsibilities." 17 4 The Second Circuit also noted
167 Id. at 265.
168 Pierce, 561 F.2d at 739 (citing Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 274 (Wright, J.,
dissenting)).
169 Id., at 739-40.
170 Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 262.
171 See, e.g., United States v. Stine, 646 F.2d 839, 842-43 (3d Cir. 1981) (upholding the
revocation of probation for a defendant who violated a condition requiring psychological
treatment and implicitly accepting the Consuelo-Gonzalez balancing test); United States v.
Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Consuelo-Gonzalez and holding that a
condition of probation must be "reasonably related to rehabilitation of the probationer,
protection of the pubic against other offenses during its term, deterrence of future miscon-
duct by the probationer or general deterrence of others, condign punishment, or some
combination of these objectives"); cf. Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 333 (10th Cir. 1971)
(holding in a case predating Consuelo-Gonzalez that conditions of probation must have "a
reasonable relationship to the treatment of the accused and the protection of the public").
172 See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying notes.
173 957 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc).
174 Id. at 982.
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that Asherman was penalized not for the exercise of his constitutional
rights, but for "failure to answer a relevant inquiry."175 Asherman's
parole was revoked due to his failure to abide by the condition requir-
ing a psychiatric examination, not simply due to his silence. Because
the state needed to conduct a psychiatric examination to establish the
defendant's fitness for parole, Asherman's failure to respond to ques-
tions resulted in the need to employ alternative options. Because pa-
role was not a viable alternative, the state had no other option than to
revoke Asherman's home release and to incarcerate him.
The distinction between the consequences that follow the failure
to answer a relevant inquiry and punishment for the assertion of Fifth
Amendment rights forces courts to balance the needs of the criminal
justice system against the constitutional protections. It is impermis-
sible for a court to increase a criminal's sentence or to revoke proba-
tion merely because the defendant invokes the Fifth Amendment. 76
If, however, the criminal refuses to answer a relevant inquiry 17 7 that is
rationally related to the goals of incarceration or probation, then the
defendant's interest in remaining silent should be balanced against
the interests of the state and the requirements of the criminal system.
When the balance tilts in favor of the government, making the
defendant choose (between waiving the privilege and thus receiving
certain benefits, such as probation instead of incarceration, or assert-
ing the privilege and facing the consequences he would have had to
face had probation not been available in the first place) is not uncon-
stitutional. 178 In such cases, the failure to assert the privilege should
be deemed a voluntary waiver.
In any case a court should first determine whether the Fifth
Amendment applies at all. The court may then determine the extent
of the Fifth Amendment protection. In the postconviction context, a
court should consider the following: the legitimacy of the govern-
ment's purpose, with effectuating rehabilitation being a more legiti-
175 Id. at 983. The court emphasized that the questioner did not express interest in
using the statements in a later criminal proceeding. Id. The court appeared to draw a
distinction based on the focus of the proceeding. Here, the commissioner was not trying to
amass evidence for a later criminal proceeding; instead he was attempting to ascertain the
appropriateness of Asherman's home release status.
176 Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278 (1968).
177 The protections of the Fifth Amendment do not fail before every relevant inquiry.
For example, when a police officer asks a suspect specific questions about a crime, that
inquiry is relevant to the government's interest in maintaining law and order. The Fifth
Amendment, however, applies in full force. A court must consider the purpose behind the
inquiry. Gathering evidence for a criminal trial is not a legitimate goal permitting compul-
sion under the Fifth Amendment. See supra part II.A. Alternatively, compelling answers to
facilitate rehabilitation is a legitimate goal. Id. Even so, the court must balance the inter-
ests involved and the defendant must be allowed the choice of whether to answer or not.
178 SeeMcGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971) ("[T]he Constitution does not
... always forbid requiring [a defendant] to choose.").
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mate goal than coercing a confession; the relevance of the condition
to a legitimate goal of the state; and the individual's interest in the
protection, which depends on the probability that the government
will bring a subsequent prosecution based on the incriminating state-
ments. None of these considerations is determinative; each situation
should be evaluated on its own facts. Nor should this list be consid-
ered exhaustive. Additional considerations may include whether
there are viable alternatives to the particular rehabilitation program
or whether the state can grant immunity. This flexible approach
should avoid the need for narrow exceptions to the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Instead, courts should decide
cases on an individual basis, taking into account many different fac-
tors, not least of which is the importance of rehabilitative programs.
B. Application of the Balancing Test
The following subsections apply the proposed balancing test to
two recent Supreme Court cases. In each case, the lower court had
imposed a general condition of probation that conflicted with the
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. Because in
both cases the conditions were relevant to the rehabilitation of the
convicted criminal and were necessary to achieve goals of the criminal
justice system, the interests of both the state and the defendants
should be weighed. Consequently, in both cases this Note concludes
that interests of the state outweigh those of the defendants.
1. Condition of Truth--Minnesota v. Murphy
In Minnesota v. Murphy,179 the defendant claimed that a condition
of probation requiring him to speak truthfully to his probation officer
violated the Fifth Amendment. After pleading guilty to a sex offense,
Murphy was given a suspended sentence and placed on probation. 80
During the course of court-ordered therapy, the probationer told his
therapist about a previous rape and murder he had committed. The
therapist contacted Murphy's probation officer, who arranged a meet-
ing with Murphy and questioned him about the incident.' 8 ' Murphy
voluntarily admitted the crime. The probation officer related the in-
179 465 U.S. 420 (1984). See generaUy Shelby Webb,Jr., Note, Constitutional Law-Warn-
ing to Probationers: Admissions Made to Your Probation Officer Without Prior Warning Can Be Used
Against You in a Subsequent Criminal Proceeding--Minnesota v. Murphy, 28 How. L.J. 355
(1985) (arguing that Murphy substantially clarifies the contours of a probationer's constitu-
tional rights).
180 Murphy, 465 U.S. at 422.
181 Id, at 423 n.1. This is a good example of a situation in which privileging the com-
munications between the therapist and the client did not work. Although the therapist
could not testify in court about his knowledge, he was not barred from informing the
probation officer. See discussion supra part III.B.1.
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criminating information to the police, who issued a warrant for Mur-
phy's arrest. 182 As mentioned earlier,183 a probation revocation
proceeding is not considered a criminal prosecution; thus, any state-
ments made by a probationer can be used to demonstrate a violation
of a condition of probation. 84 The state used Murphy's statements,
however, not only to revoke his probation, but also to prosecute him
subsequent to the revocation proceeding. 18 5
The Court found that Murphy had voluntarily waived his Fifth
Amendment protection and that he had been under no compulsion
to speak.' s6 Additionally, the Court failed to find any of the excep-
tions which grant automatic immunity: Murphy would not have in-
criminated himself by simply claiming the right;'8 7 a conversation with
a probation officer under these circumstances is not considered a cus-
todial interrogation; 8 and he had not been threatened with a pen-
alty for remaining silent.'8 9 The Court emphasized, however, that "if
the State, either expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of
the privilege would lead to revocation of the probation, it would have
created the classic penalty situation." 90
The majority dismissed Murphy's claim that the confidence in-
spired by the probation officer and that Murphy's possible fear of rev-
ocation of his probation led him to volunteer information he would
not have offered had he been apprised of his rights.' 9 ' Dissenting,
Justice Marshall argued that the state presented Murphy with the
"Hobson's choice, of incriminating himself or suffering a penalty." 92
Because the threat to revoke probation was coercive and no Miranda
warnings were given, Justice Marshall would have automatically immu-
nized Murphy's statements from use in a future prosecution. 193
The application of a balancing test would avoid this conflict be-
tween the majority and dissent by acknowledging that the Fifth
Amendment protections are triggered but weighing their application
182 Murphy, 465 U.S. at 423-24.
183 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
184 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
185 Murphy, 465 U.S. at 425.
186 Id. at 429.
187 Id. at 439-40.
188 Id. at 431.
189 Id. at 439.
190 Id. at 435. In a footnote clarifying this statement, the Court noted that the Fifth
Amendment would not apply if compliance with the condition would not pose a realistic
threat of incrimination-if, for example, the condition were merely a residential restric-
tion, or a limitation on travel. Furthermore, in dicta, the Court noted that a state could
compel a probationer to answer even incriminating questions as long as it provided immu-
nity from future criminal prosecution. Id. at 437 n.7.
'91 Id. at 431-33.
192 Id. at 443 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
193 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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against the state's interest in effective probation. The threat of proba-
tion revocation may influence a defendant's willingness to offer infor-
mation. However, because the requirement of truthfulness was a
legitimate condition of Murphy's probation and was not designed to
present him with an unconstitutional choice, Murphy was not entitled
to automatic immunity.
Both the majority and dissent emphasized the distinction be-
tween questions pertaining to the original prosecution and questions
about a different crime.194 As to the former, the Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent is extinguished after a final conviction. 195 The
protections remain available, however, in the latter inquiries.196 The
condition involved here was a general one which merely required
Murphy to be truthful to his probation officer; it did not require him
to disclose specific incriminating incidents. Such conditions are rele-
vant to the government's interest in promoting successful probation
and rehabilitation. The probationary relationship, like the therapeu-
tic relationship, is premised on trust. In order for the probation of-
ficer to be as effective as possible, the defendant must be truthful.
This does not mean that the defendant cannot remain silent; but if he
speaks he must not lie. Murphy, for example, could have remained
silent without violating his probation. Ultimately, the state's interest
in promoting truthfulness outweighed the defendant's interest in
avoiding coercive pressures. 197 Therefore, Murphy's failure to assert
the privilege was appropriately considered a voluntary waiver.
2. Condition of Successful Completion of Therapy-State v. Imlay' 98
Imlay, like Murphy, stood trial and was found guilty. Unlike Mur-
phy, however, Imlay asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege during
therapy and claimed that he was penalized for his silence. During the
trial he voluntarily testified and maintained his innocence. 19 9 There-
fore, the requirement that Imlay admit guilt as part of a therapy pro-
gram presented a real fear that he might face criminal prosecution for
perjury. As noted earlier, there is no protection for perjured state-
194 Id. at 426, 441 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
195 See discussion supra part II.A.1.
196 See discussion supra part II.A.1.
197 This is consistent with the failure of the immunity statutes to cover prosecutions for
perjury. The constitutional protection is not interpreted to allow false testimony. See dis-
cussion supra part II.A.
198 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1260, cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct.
444 (1992).
199 Id. at 985.
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ments. 20 0 Therefore, in contrast to the parental reunification cases, 20 1
the state could not have immunized Imlay's statements in order to
compel answers. 20 2 Because there is no protection for false state-
ments, if Imlay were forced to admit guilt he could be charged with
perjuring himself in the earlier proceeding.
Even when there is a real fear of incrimination, the Fifth Amend-
ment is not available absent governmental compulsion. 203 Here, as in
the plea bargaining situation, the defendant faces a choice. The Con-
stitution "does not forbid 'every government-imposed choice in the
criminal process that has the effect of discouraging the exercise of
constitutional rights.' "204 Montana did not force Imlay to admit his
guilt; it merely provided him with a means of rehabilitation which he
could have chosen not to accept.20 5 As one state court noted, "[elven
if the requirement of admission of guilt... impinged on Fifth Amend-
ment rights, the inmate is not compelled to incriminate himself be-
cause the inmate may choose not to participate in the program."20 6
Additionally, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes207 the Supreme Court, examin-
ing plea bargains, stated that "there is no such element of punishment
or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject [an offer
of a different sentence] ."208 The state's goal is not to force those inno-
cent of the crimes for which they have been convicted to perjure
themselves during therapy. Instead, the intention of the state is to
help guilty criminals accept responsibility for their actions and also to
prevent recidivism. The choice between probation and incarceration
involves governmental compulsion; few would choose confinement in
200 See discussion supra part II.A. But cf. Scott M. Solkoff, Note, Judicial Use Immunity
and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Court Mandated Therapy Programs, 17 NovA L.
REV. 1441 (1993) (advocating the application of judicial use immunity in the Imlay
context).
201 See discussion supra part III.B.
202 Immunity is only effective if the defendant is protected from all later criminal pros-
ecutions stemming from the compelled testimony.
203 See discussion supra part II.B.
204 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 236 (1980) (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe,
412 U.S. 17, 30 (1973)). Jenkins recognized the importance of considering the legitimacy
of the challenged governmental practice in determining whether a constitutional right has
been impermissibly burdened. Id. at 238.
205 The goal in this situation is to help the defendant, rather than to amass evidence
for another criminal prosecution. In Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986), the Court dis-
tinguished between statutes that aim to provide treatment and those that aim to define
criminal activities. The former are civil in nature and thus do not invoke the protections of
the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 375. In such a situation, the purpose of eliciting the defend-
ant's admission of guilt is to provide treatment, not to label him a criminal or to prosecute
him for perjury.
206 Henderson v. State, 543 So.2d 344, 346 (Fla. Dist. C. App. 1989) (holding that
conditioning the early release of a sex offender upon his satisfactory participation in a
therapy program did not violate the Fifth Amendment).
207 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
208 Id. at 363.
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a cell over the relative freedom offered by probation. Such compul-
sion, however, does not always rise to the level of constitutional infir-
mity. Rather than asserting that the Fifth Amendment is not triggered
in these situations, it is more accurate to admit the presence of the
evils against which the constitutional privilege seeks to protect. The
analysis should not end there, however. Once a court establishes that
the Fifth Amendment is triggered, it should then ask whether it is
appropriate to apply its protections. The court should do this by bal-
ancing the interests of the criminal against those of the state.
The state has a strong interest in rehabilitating criminals through
therapy and probation. First, the purpose of therapy is to provide
treatment, not to punish; its use stems from society's interest in reha-
bilitation. The therapist is not a law enforcement officer and has no
power to detain a patient who is unwilling to participate. Therapists
strive to create a supportive environment in which people can feel
comfortable talking about their problems. Under no circumstances
would a competent therapist threaten a patient. Second, acceptance
of responsibility is a necessary condition of therapy.209 Third, rehabil-
itation is a legitimate goal of law enforcement210 and this goal re-
quires effective therapy programs. As the American Professional
Society on the Abuse of Children noted in its amicus brief in Imlay:
Effective treatment depends on cooperation between treatment
professionals and the criminal justice system, particularly courts and
probation and parole officials. The courts play a critical role by
mandating participation in treatment as a condition of probation or
parole. Court-ordered treatment provides an important external
motivator for offenders to enter and remain in treatment.21'
Finally, it is unlikely that the government will prosecute the proba-
tioner for perjury based on incriminating statements made during
therapy.212
209 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
210 United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 (1978). Although this Note focuses on
the rehabilitative goals of the criminal justice system, there are other interests that may
conflict with the Fifth Amendment's protections. This Note does not intend to suggest
that all such considerations should trump the privilege. It is important, however, to recog-
nize some of the cases which have focused on other goals. See, e.g., McGuatha, 402 U.S. at
217 (per curiam) (holding that the privilege was not violated by the state requirement that
a jury determine guilt and punishment in the same proceeding and stating that the poli-
cies behind the amendment were "not offended when a defendant in a capital case yields
to the pressure to testify on the issue of punishment at the risk of damaging his case on
guilt"); United States v. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. 1111 (1993) (holding that the government's
interest in appropriate punishment permits a court to increase a defendant's sentence
when he or she commits willful perjury during the trial).
211 APSAC Brief, supra note 2, at 8-9.
212 Perjury charges are generally difficult to prove, and thus the government does not
often choose to expend its limited resources on such prosecutions. In the therapy context,
[Vol. 79:700
NOT-COURT-ORDERED THERAPY
The state's interests in fostering individual responsibility and re-
habilitation outweigh Imlay's interest in avoiding self-incrimination.
The requirement of therapy programs that a person accept responsi-
bility is indispensable to their rehabilitative goal. Additionally, a per-
son in Imlay's situation may still choose whether or not to comply with
the condition of probation. Although he may still appeal his verdict,
he may not use the Fifth Amendment to shield him from the punish-
ment legally imposed for his crime. He may, in effect, choose his pun-
ishment, whether it be probation and therapy or incarceration.
Because a probationer's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination is not violated even if his probation is revoked, the bal-
ance favors allowing the condition.
CONCLUSION
There is no consensus on the application of the Fifth Amend-
ment protections in postsentencing situations. Montana v. Imlay pro-
vided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify the operation
of the privilege in this context. For procedural reasons, the Court
chose not to take advantage of the opportunity.213 The implications
of the Montana Supreme Court opinion, holding that the court-or-
dered sex-offender program violated the Fifth Amendment, may be
profound. If therapy programs are no longer used for fear of imping-
ing on criminals' Fifth Amendment rights, the use of rehabilitative
sentencing alternatives, such as probation, will likely decline.
As prison populations increase, we need realistic and appropriate
alternatives to incarceration. Rehabilitation through probation and
therapy offers a sound alternative. Therapy programs are a traditional
form of psychological treatment and generally are not unusually intru-
sive. Furthermore, concerns that therapy is ineffective in the correc-
tional setting because of the inherently coercive atmosphere21 4 are
less forceful in the probationary context. It therefore becomes impor-
tant to retain such programs as part of the probation scheme, lest
rehabilitative operations disappear entirely from the criminal system.
Therapy is an ideal rehabilitation-focused alternative. If courts cannot
impose reasonable conditions to ensure compliance with therapy pro-
grams, however, this alternative may well disappear.
The procedural safeguards of the Fifth Amendment recognize
the criminal system's fallibility. Although the emphasis on perfecting
the means of separating the guilty from the innocent is justifiable, it
should not undermine procedures used to achieve other goals of the
the state is likely to be more concerned with rehabilitating the offender than with ob-
taining another conviction.
213 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
214 See, e.g., Veneziano, supra note 10, at 141.
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system such as punishment and rehabilitation. The protections must
be balanced against the overall objective of the criminal legal sys-
tem-to insure the safety of our society by providing a means for both
punishment and rehabilitation. Therapy programs, which force an of-
fender to accept responsibility for his actions and work toward avoid-
ing recidivism, provide one of the best means to effectuate this latter
goal.
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